| 1 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT |
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| 2 | EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | In Re FLINT WATER CASES Case No. 16-10444 |
| 6 | |
| 7 | / |
| 8 | STATUS CONFERENCE |
| 9 | |
| 10 | BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDITH E. LEVY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE |
| 11 | MAY 15, 2019 |
| 12 | ADDEADANGED IN ALDUADERICAL ODDED. |
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| 25 | United States District Court 200 East Liberty Street - Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104 |
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| 1 | <u>PROCEEDINGS</u> |
|----|---|
| 2 | THE CLERK: Calling the Flint Water Cases. |
| 3 | THE COURT: Welcome. And thank you for moving over |
| 4 | to this courtroom. I feel like Goldilocks. The chair is not |
| 5 | the chair I'm used to. And I'm sure that's true for all of |
| 6 | you as well. |
| 7 | So could we have appearances for the record? |
| 8 | But before doing that, I'm going to try to log on to |
| 9 | make sure that I can get access to all of the materials. I'll |
| 10 | just do that first. Okay. I'm on. |
| 11 | So could we have appearances for the record, please? |
| 12 | MR. LEOPOLD: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Ted |
| 13 | Leopold, co-lead counsel for the punitive class. |
| 14 | THE COURT: Thank you. |
| 15 | MR. PITT: Michael Pitt, co-lead for class. |
| 16 | MR. SHKOLNIK: Hunter Shkolnik, co-liaison counsel. |
| 17 | MR. STERN: Corey Stern, co-liaison counsel. |
| 18 | THE COURT: Thank you. Hold on just a minute. I'm |
| 19 | going to borrow some of Judge Grand's paper. I'll just borrow |
| 20 | this brief. Oh, here's some paper. Oh, never mind. Okay. |
| 21 | All right. Mr. Goodman. No, Ms. Greenspan. |
| 22 | MS. GREENSPAN: Deborah Greenspan, special master. |
| 23 | MR. GOODMAN: William Goodman appearing on behalf of |
| 24 | class plaintiffs and the Marble family. |
| 25 | THE COURT: Thank you. |
| J | II . |

```
MR. BRONSTEIN: Peretz Bronstein, plaintiffs class.
 1
 2
               MS. BINGMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Teresa
 3
     Bingman appearing on behalf of the class plaintiffs and the
 4
     Marble family.
 5
               THE COURT: Okay.
                                 Thank you.
 6
               MR. STAMATOPOULOS: Gregory Stamatopoulos on behalf
 7
     of class plaintiffs.
 8
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: Good afternoon, Esther Berezofsky on
 9
     behalf of the class and the Gulla plaintiffs.
10
               THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
11
               MS. SHEA: Ashley Shea on behalf of the class
12
     plaintiffs.
13
               MS. HURWITZ: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Julie
14
     Hurwitz appearing on behalf of the class plaintiffs.
15
               MS. DEVINE: Alaina Devine on behalf of the VNA
16
      defendants.
17
               MR. CAMPBELL: James Campbell on behalf of the three
18
     VNA defendants.
19
               MR. NOVAK: Paul Novak on behalf of class plaintiffs.
20
               MR. THOMPSON: Craig Thompson on behalf of defendant
21
     Rowe Professional.
22
               MR. RUSEK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Alexander
23
     Rusek on behalf of Howard Croft. And joining me is my law
24
     clerk Shelby Well.
25
               THE COURT: Oh, great. Thank you.
```

```
MR. KIM: Thank you, Your Honor. William Kim
 1
 2
      appearing on behalf of the City of Flint and former Mayor
 3
      Dayne Walling.
               MR. BERG: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Rick Berg for
 4
 5
      the City of Flint.
 6
               MR. BARBIERI: Charles Barbieri for MDEQ defendants
 7
     Michael Prysby and Patrick Cook.
 8
               THE COURT: Okay. And I did get your message that
 9
      you ran into traffic. So I'm glad that you --
               MR. BARBIERI: A number of us did. Sorry, Your
10
11
      Honor.
12
               THE COURT: Okay.
13
               MR. GRASHOFF: Your Honor, Phil Grashoff appearing on
      behalf of Stephen Busch, MDEQ employee defendant.
14
15
               MR. PATTWELL: Mike Pattwell on behalf of Brad Wurfel
16
      and Dan Wyant.
               MR. WISE: Your Honor, Matt Wise on behalf of Jeffrey
17
18
      Wright.
19
               MR. KUHL: Richard Kuhl on behalf of the state
20
      defendants.
21
               MR. LARSEN: Zack Larsen on behalf of state
22
      defendants.
23
               MS. BETTENHAUSEN: Margaret Bettenhausen for state
24
      defendants.
25
               MR. MCALPINE: Mark McAlpine state class liaison
```

```
counsel.
 1
 2
               MS. SEALEY: Shermane Sealey on behalf of class
 3
      plaintiffs.
               MR. FAJAN: James Fajan on behalf of Adam Rosenthal.
 4
 5
               MR. WILDER: Marvin Wilder for Lillian Diallo for
 6
      individual plaintiffs Savage, Kirkland, and Gist.
 7
               MR. MATEO: T. Santino Mateo on behalf of Mr. Earley,
 8
      Darnell Earley.
 9
               MS. PIPER: Kailen Piper on behalf of defendant
10
      Glasgow.
11
               MR. MONROE: Stephen Monroe on behalf of the class
12
      plaintiffs, Your Honor.
13
               MR. JENSEN: Larry Jensen on behalf of Hurley Medical
      Center and Ann Newell and Nora Birchmeier.
14
15
               MR. MEYERS: David Meyers on behalf of defendant
16
      Daugherty Johnson.
17
               MS. CHRISTOPHERSON: Gladys Christopherson on behalf
18
      of Anderson, Lee, and local counsel for Gulla plaintiff.
19
               MR. WASHINGTON: Val Washington on behalf of
20
      Anderson, Lee, local counsel for part of the Gulla plaintiffs,
21
      Judge.
22
               THE COURT: Thank you.
23
               MR. KRAUSE: Kirk Krause on behalf of Robert Scott,
24
      Your Honor.
25
               MR. CAFFERTY: Michael Cafferty on behalf of Nancy
```

```
Peeler.
 1
 2
              MR. SANDERS: Herb Sanders on behalf of the Alexander
 3
      plaintiffs.
              MS. FLETCHER: Shayla Fletcher on behalf of the
 4
 5
      Alexander plaintiffs.
 6
               MR. SEGARS: Darryl Segars on behalf of the Alexander
 7
      plaintiffs.
 8
               THE COURT: They're well represented I see. Thank
 9
      you.
               MR. GESKE: Paul Geske on behalf of the Guertin
10
11
      plaintiffs.
12
               THE COURT: Okay.
13
               MS. SMITH: Susan Smith on behalf of McLaren Regional
      Medical Center.
14
15
              MR. WEGLARZ: Todd Weglarz for plaintiff Odie Brown
      and plaintiff Gradine Rogers.
16
               MR. LANCIOTTI: Patrick Lanciotti for the individual
17
18
      plaintiffs.
19
               THE COURT: All right. Thank you, very much.
20
              MR. ERICKSON: Your Honor, there's a few of us left I
21
      think. Philip Erickson on behalf of the LAN defendants and
22
      Leo A Daly.
23
               MR. KLEIN: Sheldon Klein on behalf of the city.
24
               MS. LEVENS: Emmy Levens for class plaintiffs.
25
               THE COURT: Okay. Anyone else want to make an
```

appearance? Now is your chance. Okay

Well before we go any further, I had a request from Mr. Hart on behalf of the Guertin plaintiffs to appear by telephone. He's not answering his telephone. So in light of the fact that we have other counsel here, we're just going to proceed and assume that you'll be here to handle his request to be appointed as appellate liaison counsel. So thank you very much for that.

I apologize for getting started late. We had the regular standing meeting in chambers. And that went over a little bit. So that's the cause of starting late.

So the first issue on the agenda is the outstanding motions in the Carthan case. And essentially there -- I will be issuing written decisions on the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration regarding the Elliott Larsen claim. I've already issued an hour or two ago a decision on Veolia's motion to correct.

And so what's stated here that no oral argument on those will be permitted, they have been -- there's a plan for those.

With respect to the Guertin plaintiffs to appoint motion -- or appellate counsel as lead appellate counsel, I've considered the motion that was submitted in writing. And although I appreciate it that this is obviously complex litigation, that there are many balls in the air at any given

time, I have already appointed lead counsel for both the individual plaintiffs' cases and the class cases.

And at this point, I don't see that it would benefit the cases to have additional counsel appointed in terms of the appellate work that's going on. I do appreciate that there are amicus briefs that are to be coordinated, that there are arguments to be made, but I trust that counsel is capable of working cooperatively with the lead counsel in achieving that.

So the motion for appointment of liaison appellate counsel will be denied because there is currently lead counsel for all of the folks who are to be represented. And I trust that Mr. Hart and counsel who's present today will coordinate successfully with the lead counsel.

In terms of Veolia's motion to -- and then we'll issue an order that just says for the reasons set forth on the record that that is the decision.

On Veolia's motion to strike the proposed classes, a brief discussion -- there's Mr. Campbell. A brief discussion was held in chambers that wherein I learned that plaintiffs' counsel, plaintiffs' class counsel is currently in the process of developing revised proposed classes.

So at this point, Veolia's motion will be denied as moot. Or not as moot. But it simply -- we're going to see a new proposed class definitions. I said upstairs and I'll repeat here, there's a good deal of the motion that I think is

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correct and would be granted if this were the class that
 2
      plaintiffs were planning to stick with.
 3
               But in light of the fact that I've been informed that
 4
      the definitions are in a state of flux, I don't think it would
 5
     be helpful to grant the motion at this point. And so it will
 6
      be either denied. Or if Veolia wants to withdraw it and then
 7
      just file a new one if you don't care for the new classes,
 8
      that would be your prerogative. Mr. Campbell.
 9
               MR. CAMPBELL: James Campbell for the VNA defendants,
10
      Your Honor. I'll have to check with Mr. Grunert.
11
      just get back to the Court on that with the way we want to
12
      proceed.
13
               THE COURT: Okay.
14
               MR. CAMPBELL: I can do that in a day.
15
               THE COURT: Okay. If you can get back to us by close
16
      of business on Friday.
17
               MR. CAMPBELL: Perfect. Thank you, your Honor.
18
               THE COURT: Then we'll enter an order after that.
19
      you don't withdraw the motion -- either way, the denial will
20
      be without prejudice. Once we know what the class definitions
21
      are, and I trust that we'll be learning that relatively soon,
```

MR. CAMPBELL: Understood. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So the next issue is the update on

Walters, Sirls, and Marble. And with respect to Walters and

then you certainly can challenge those definitions.

22

23

24

Sirls, I think everybody here knows that I ruled on the Carthan motion to amend, motion to dismiss, and so on. That's currently awaiting the Sixth Circuit's decision on whether they will take the case en banc to reconsider the three judge panel's decision.

And while that is taking place, I am working on similar motions in the Walters and Sirls cases. So I will just update everybody that that is a work in progress. And although it seems that it should be relatively straightforward to just apply what was said in Carthan to these two complaints, it is more complicated than it looks like because of the nuances in the way the complaints were drafted. But it's a work in progress and I hope to turn or get it done as soon as possible.

Walters and Sirls is decided -- I think we've already discussed this -- I'll turn to Marble as sort of a sample of legionella that is also suing another defendant, McLaren Hospital.

As I started looking at Marble in preparation for today's hearing, it occurred to me that we don't have a test case, for lack of a better word, with Hurley Hospital as a defendant. And Mr. Jensen is here. There you are.

So my decision as of today is to expand the Court's consideration. When I consider Marble, I'd like to also

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consider the Brown case. And Mr. Weglarz is here, too.
that we have a case to test the sufficiency of the pleadings
as far as Hurley is concerned as well as McLaren. So I'll be
-- so we'll be amending the sort of case management process by
including the Brown case.
        Mr. Weglarz, where are you?
        MR. WEGLARZ: Right here, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: There you are. So I take it you hear
what I'm saying and will be prepared for that.
        MR. WEGLARZ: Yes, Your Honor.
        THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Jensen, do you have any
objection to that proposal?
        MR. JENSEN: Your Honor --
        THE COURT: Say your name. I'm sorry. We have to go
by the rules, which is make sure you state your name and your
client.
        MR. JENSEN: Larry Jensen on behalf of Hurley
defendants and Birchmeier as well. Your Honor, as you know
and as I may have the opportunity to --
        THE COURT: Speak up.
        MR. JENSEN: Excuse me. Hurley's in only two cases,
Brown and Rogers. So to include them at this point being
lumped in with all of the other cases, but to move that ahead,
it still splits Hurley up in that respect because it leaves
Rogers behind.
```

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1
               THE COURT: Well, Rogers will -- is there anything
 2
      unique about the Rogers case? Are there any different legal
 3
      claims or counts in Rogers that are not in Brown?
 4
               MR. JENSEN: Not that I'm aware of, no.
 5
               THE COURT: Okay. So all I'm looking for is a
 6
      lawsuit that will test the sufficiency of the pleading as to
 7
      your client. And if you want to suggest a different one from
 8
      Brown, that's okay with me.
 9
               MR. JENSEN: No. I'd just like to keep them
10
      together, Your Honor --
11
               THE COURT: Oh, you want --
12
               MR. JENSEN: -- for sufficiency purposes.
13
               THE COURT: Whatever I decide in Brown will apply to
14
      Rogers.
15
               MR. JENSEN: That's fine.
16
               THE COURT: So they're together in that sense. Okay.
17
               So Mr. Goodman, I just want to remind you of sort of
18
      how we got to this point or one of the procedural issues that
19
      has come up which is that the pleading in Marble will
20
      ultimately need to be amended. Because once the Walters and
21
      Sirls decision is made, there will be an amended master
22
      long-form complaint that your pleading will need to conform
23
      to.
24
               So what I will permit for -- and this goes to Mr.
25
      Weglarz as well -- is that once the Walters and Sirls decision
```

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has been made, even while it's on appeal, while it's pending, it's en banc in U.S. Supreme Court and all of the things that might happen to it, I will permit as a right for the plaintiffs in Marble and the plaintiffs in Brown to file an amended short-form complaint that tells me which parts of the master long-form complaint you wish to adopt.
```

And you may automatically bring in the counts, the claims that you previously raised. If you wish to raise new claims for any reason, new counts and allege new facts, you would need to submit a motion to amend.

MR. GOODMAN: So that any -- excuse me, Your Honor. William Goodman appearing on behalf of the Marble family. So that any factual elaboration then will have to be pursuant to the motion to amend; is that correct?

THE COURT: Yes. Any factual or legal expansion from what you currently are alleging would need to be subjected to motion for leave to amend. But if what you're doing is just conforming your short-form complaint to the new master long form. Because we already know from what was decided in Carthan, there will be some changes to the proposed amended complaint in Walters and Sirls. So if there are any changes that expand your case, you'd need to file a motion for leave.

MR. GOODMAN: Thank you, your Honor. I understand and will follow the Court's guidance.

THE COURT: Okay. And Mr. Weglarz?

```
Understood, Your Honor. And I also had
 1
               MR. WEGLARZ:
 2
      the benefit of Ms. Susan Smith explaining your decision 20
 3
      minutes ahead of time. So thank you for that.
 4
               THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Smith. Okay.
 5
      Okay.
 6
               So now we're on the issue of the case management
 7
           And I have briefing from McLaren and Hurley arguing
 8
      that you should be exempted from the case management plan
 9
      until your pleadings have been tested in some -- with the
      motion to dismiss.
10
11
               And I am happy to hear more if there's something
12
      that's not in your written material that you want to add now,
13
      you can add it. But if it's in your written material, then I
14
      won't need to hear it again today.
15
               So Ms. Smith, is there anything you want to add that
16
      you have not said in your thorough brief?
17
                           No. We'll await the decision on the
               MS. SMITH:
      issue after the Walters and Sirls amendment process is
18
19
      completed.
20
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
21
               MS. SMITH:
                          Thank you.
22
               THE COURT: Mr. Jensen.
23
               MR. JENSEN: Same goes for Hurley defendants, Your
24
      Honor.
25
               THE COURT:
                          Okay. So here's what -- the only choice
```

that I think I have -- obviously I have many choices. But what I think this case requires is that at this time I deny the request to be exempted from the case management order.

I understand Hurley has made a compelling argument that it's in three cases, in three individual cases at this point. McLaren has made a similar compelling argument. And so I am going to do everything I can to expedite the handling of Walters, Sirls, Hurley, and Brown -- or Marble and Brown.

But in the end I think Hurley and McLaren will need to proceed as nonparties to the case management order so that all of this is not duplicated later. And at any rate you would be nonparties regardless of whether you're in those cases anyway. You've been listed as nonparties at fault by other parties in the case, other defendants in the case, and would be subjected to the case management order.

But at the same time, the legionella issues are not before the Court in the first ruined of bellwether cases. So it seems to me that the burden is at least lessened by that.

So I'll do my part to expedite handling of your motions to dismiss. And in the meantime you'll remain subjected to the case management order. In some ways as you would whether or not you were a defendant in those cases.

Now on the case management plan there's also the issue of the City of Flint and individual Flint defendants who have just filed I think while we were upstairs, an answer was

filed by the city or --

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2
                          By the city only.
               MR. KLEIN:
 3
               THE COURT: City only. And so the issue is where --
 4
      that now that the city has filed an answer it has a different
      status under the case management order. And in light of the
 5
 6
      fact that it's relatively soon after the order was entered on
 7
      April 30th, the city will just play catchup and be subjected
      if to the same timeframes.
 8
 9
               But Mr. Klein, you alerted me to some other issues
10
      that you'd like to raise.
11
               MR. KLEIN: Your Honor, may I speak from here or do
12
      you prefer I go to the podium?
13
               THE COURT: I think the podium would be helpful.
14
               MR. KLEIN: Thank you, your Honor. Just for the
15
      record, Sheldon Klein for the City of Flint. There's really
16
      only one issue that I want to raise.
17
               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
18
                          And it's this. The Court will recall
               MR. KLEIN:
19
      that in the case management order there was a provision, and I
20
      frankly don't know the section at hand, in which the
21
      defendants were to serve a large set of common interrogatories
22
      and then not to exceed five defendant specific
23
      interrogatories.
24
               The then answering defendants or just to say the
25
      engineering defendants plus Mr. Rosenthal issued those uniform
```

interrogatories and did so in a way that I think makes the five individual interrogatories unfair to us under the circumstances. And I'll point to a few examples and then add one other point.

I have in front of me the uniform interrogatory sent to plaintiff Kelso. Similar -- and of course they weren't filed but similar interrogatories were sent to a number of other individual plaintiffs.

And the first way that it's unfair to us is that plaintiffs or excuse me the serving defendants, the engineering defendants plus Mr. Rosenthal defined -- defendants defined term to include only them and thus to exclude the other defendants who albeit not answering defendants were still defendants.

And the way that that turns out being unfair to us is they ask interrogatories such as -- and I'm referring to interrogatory 17 of these -- describe every public meeting and hearing you attended in which any of the defendants spoke and what did they say.

Now given the way they've defined defendants they're not being asked anything the City of Flint said, anything the MDEQ said, etcetera, etcetera. I mean frankly I think it was -- I think deliberately opportunistic on their part.

But in any case it is a sensible interrogatory but it's one that we would need to use up our -- do you have the

```
interrogatories up there, Your Honor?
 1
 2
               THE COURT: I don't have the interrogatories and I
 3
      shouldn't have the interrogatories.
 4
               MR. KLEIN:
                          Right.
 5
               THE COURT: But I have the case management order.
 6
      And it says additionally in paragraph 3 page 10, each
 7
      defendant may serve five interrogatories on each named
 8
      plaintiff. And you're saying that's not enough for your
 9
      clients?
                          Because the so called uniform
10
               MR. KLEIN:
11
      interrogatories --
12
               THE COURT:
                          Oh.
13
               MR. KLEIN: -- were drafted in a way that
14
      deliberately prevented us from getting information that should
15
      have been available from the uniform interrogatories.
16
               THE COURT: And who -- were those propounded by VNA?
17
               MR. KLEIN:
                           They were propounded by the engineering
18
      defendants plus Mr. Rosenthal.
19
               THE COURT: Rosenthal.
20
               MR. KLEIN: It's a perfectly sensible question.
21
                           Okay.
               THE COURT:
22
                          And had defendants meant defendants
               MR. KLEIN:
23
      rather than only the propounding defendants, then we would
24
      have the information that we need as to what they say we said.
25
               THE COURT:
                           Okay. Well let me stop you right there
```

```
and ask either Mr. Stern or Mr. Shkolnik if you have a
 1
 2
      response. Say your name and go to the podium.
 3
               MR. STERN: Corey Stern. I mean, I firmly believe
 4
      that the CMO allows for those interrogatories to be served in
 5
      the manner that they were.
 6
               THE COURT: Yes, it does. He's not doubting that.
 7
      He's just saying that he may need more than five to make up
 8
      for the fact that he wasn't a part of that process.
 9
               MR. STERN: But the reason that there wasn't -- I
10
      mean --
11
               THE COURT:
                          I know.
12
               MR. STERN: I think everybody should have the ability
13
      to prosecute and defend their cases in a meaningful way.
                                                                 Why
      there wasn't -- why he wasn't involved in the process --
14
15
               THE COURT: Well, he hadn't answered until noon
16
      today.
17
               MR. STERN: I understand.
18
               THE COURT:
                          So he wasn't a defendant by the
19
      definition of defendant in the CMO at that time.
20
               MR. STERN: But does that mean that when each of the
21
      individual city defendants answer that we get, you know -- are
22
      we going to -- what happens then?
                                        I mean --
23
               THE COURT: Mr. Klein, would a total of 10 for the
24
      City of Flint --
25
               MR. KLEIN: A total of 10 would be more than fair.
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```
1
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
 2
                           I have more to say. But given that 10 is
               MR. KLEIN:
 3
      more than fair, I won't say it if that's the outcome.
 4
               THE COURT: Okay. Then what I'll do is permit a
 5
      total of 10 in paragraph 3 for the City of Flint and for each
 6
      additional answering defendant.
 7
               MR. STERN:
                          Okay.
 8
                          Thank you, your Honor.
               MR. KLEIN:
 9
                          Because we're going to -- God willing
               THE COURT:
10
      we're going to have other answers in the case. And people
11
      will need to play catchup at that point, so.
12
               MR. STERN:
                          Okay.
13
               THE COURT:
                          All right. But the question is do we --
                          The trigger for the 10 comes when they
14
               MR. STERN:
15
      answer?
16
               THE COURT: After you answer. You don't become a
17
      defendant who can propound discovery under this until you file
18
      an answer. Until then, you're treated as a nonparty even
19
      though you're a named defendant.
20
               Is there anything wrong with what I just said?
21
               MR. STERN: Nothing. I'm just thinking 8 months
22
      ahead or 10 months ahead because there's going to come a point
23
      in time potentially where nonparty defendants presently become
24
      answering defendants. And they're going to have an
25
      opportunity at that point in time to start serving discovery
```

```
1
      and that may --
 2
               THE COURT: But they were always going to have that
 3
      opportunity and they were always going to get five new
 4
      interrogatories.
 5
                          Understood.
               MR. STERN:
 6
               THE COURT: So now they're going to get 10.
 7
               MR. STERN:
                          Ten.
                                 Okay.
               MR. KLEIN:
 8
                          Thank you, your Honor.
 9
               THE COURT:
                           So the question is what do we do to
      memorialize this decision? And I quess I'll issue an amended
10
11
      case management order. Because we need to have one document
12
      everyone's working from as it gets amended over time.
13
               MR. KLEIN: I guess I defer to the Court as to
14
      whether a supplemental, you know, just dealing with this issue
15
      or amended is the most convenient way.
16
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
               MR. KLEIN: The same difference.
17
18
               THE COURT:
                          I'll figure it.
19
               MR. STERN: It's pretty common just to have first
20
      amended. It could be 50th amended CMO.
21
               THE COURT: I think that's what we'll do so that the
22
      last standing one on the docket is the one for everybody to
23
      turn to. Okay.
24
               So on the plaintiff fact sheets, I'm happy to report
25
      that during the in chambers discussion I ruled on it. It just
```

```
1
      went through every page and made some decisions. And so the
 2
      fact sheet is being amended to a certain extent.
 3
               MR. RUSEK: Your Honor, Alexander Rusek on behalf of
 4
      Howard Croft.
 5
               THE COURT:
                          Yes.
 6
               MR. RUSEK: Would you like me to address the
 7
      individual city defendants who have filed a motion to stay and
 8
      who have not answered at this time in regards to the CMO?
 9
               THE COURT: Please do. Thank you for bringing that
10
      to my attention.
11
                          Thank you for the opportunity, Your
               MR. RUSEK:
12
      Honor. Three of the individual city defendants filed a motion
13
      to stay last Friday on the grounds that qualified immunity is
14
      being resolved right now. And then also on our Fifth
15
      Amendment concerns because those three are still criminally
16
      charged right now.
17
               THE COURT: Yes.
18
                          We're asking the Court to stay the cases
               MR. RUSEK:
19
      as to us. Because of those very serious concerns, and it was
20
      brought to my attention by Mr. Kim that the Court would like
21
      to hear about my thoughts on answering the complaint at this
22
      time while also being under indictment in the criminal justice
23
      system.
24
               THE COURT: And here's my -- one thing I'd like to
25
      say before you get started, which is that I have not had a
```

chance to review the law again. I've done some initial research well over a year ago on the Fifth Amendment concerns. I saw your brief and I intend to pay careful attention to it.

So what I'd like you to limit your remarks -- and I think you said you were going do this -- is to whether filing an answer implicates your client's Fifth Amendment rights. We can get to the issue of discovery once an answer is filed.

MR. RUSEK: So I believe that it does, Your Honor.

And I think that it's a different implication than say
answering an interrogatory is or request for admission. Those
of course are verified documents. An answer is not verified.

But in answering the complaint, a criminal defendant is essentially given two choices. One invoking the Fifth Amendment and not answering it. And then you're faced with the adverse inference there. Or an answer is provided and information is put out there by that defendant that while it may not technically be their statement under oath, it still can lead a prosecutor to find more evidence or lead them down a path that they would not have had before.

And I think that particularly is a concern for the two defendants who have not -- or excuse me who pled and are still potentially under investigation by federal authorities. That would be Mr. Glasgow and Mr. Johnson.

I know that they had those additional concerns. And certainly the three city defendants who are charged have very

serious concerns right now. Especially with the appointment of the new solicitor general to review everything in the cases. And I believe that she's publically said that she's reviewing not just for the validity of the charges that have been brought but also for any new potential charges that may arise through their review.

THE COURT: And just because I was logging back on to my computer that keeps shutting down on me, did you say that -- I understand that argument with respect to answering an interrogatory or a document request or a deposition for sure. But filing an answer, you're suggesting that that also could expose your clients to further criminal liability?

MR. RUSEK: I think so, Your Honor. I believe there is a difference but it is providing information that would be coming from the client and then through the attorney that potentially could be used, you know, maybe not as directly against them as answer admission, an interrogatory, but certainly it's information that could come to light that could be used against them in the future.

THE COURT: All right. Well, we don't -- thank you, Mr. Rusek. We don't currently sort of have the adversarial process. I don't have anyone -- the other side hasn't been briefed. I haven't done the research. I appreciate knowing what you're saying, hearing what you're saying. And so what I'll do is turn to that issue.

```
And do any of the plaintiffs plan to respond in
 1
 2
      writing?
 3
               MS. LEVENS: Class plaintiffs will be filing.
               THE COURT: That's Ms. Levens.
 4
 5
               MS. LEVENS:
                          Sorry.
 6
               MR. RUSEK: And Your Honor, not to get into the
 7
              I know the Court hasn't seen the arguments.
      weeds.
 8
               THE COURT: Yeah.
 9
               MR. RUSEK: But in this circuit, the most important
      factor for the Court to look at is the extent that the issues
10
11
      in each proceeding overlap. And when we look at the Carthan
12
      operative complaint right now, it takes just actual sections
      out of the criminal complaint against my client, against Mr.
13
      Earley and Mr. Ambrose, and puts it as an allegation in the
14
15
      actual complaint.
16
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
17
               MR. RUSEK: So the issues are near 100 percent
18
      overlapping.
19
               THE COURT:
                          Okay. And now you're successfully
20
      arguing your motion.
21
               MR. RUSEK: And I will rest on that, Your Honor.
22
      Thank you.
23
               THE COURT:
                          Okay. Thank you. So what I'll do is
24
      await a timely response from class plaintiffs to individual
25
      plaintiffs. Don't feel like you have to respond.
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MR. STERN: Your Honor, I think because it's based on
 1
 2
      the operative complaint and we're still unaware of what's
 3
      going to happen in Walters and Sirls that it would be
 4
      inappropriate for us to respond.
 5
               THE COURT:
                           Okay. Good. All right.
                                                     So what I'll do
 6
      is we've got a status conference scheduled for June 19th.
 7
      so what I'm assuming right now is if I'm unable to make a
 8
      decision before then based on the written submissions, we'll
 9
      have oral argument on the issue on the 19th potentially.
10
      I'm just flagging that as if there's not a decision before
11
      then, then most likely it will be on the agenda at least in
12
      some form at that time. Okay. Okay.
13
               Now on the issue of nonparty documents only subpoena
14
      -- oh, Mr. Rusek.
15
               MR. RUSEK: Your Honor, I apologize. Under the
16
      Court's order denying the motion to strike, the city
17
      defendants were required to answer by today.
18
               THE COURT:
                           Oh.
19
               MR. RUSEK: Can we push that date off potentially
20
      until a resolution of the motion to stay for the individual
21
      city defendants and those who have joined in that motion to
22
      stay?
23
               THE COURT:
                          Yes.
24
               MR. RUSEK:
                           Thank you.
25
               THE COURT:
                          Okay. We'll include that in our order
```

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1
      following this conference. When I originally put the nonparty
 2
      documents only subpoena issue on the agenda, I thought it was
 3
      because there was a happy report from the committee that this
 4
      was moving along and they were going to wish to add two
 5
      meetings per month to discuss this.
               I learned in chambers that there are a few kinks in
 6
 7
      the process that are not -- that it's not as efficient as we
 8
      were all hoping that it could be. And so we're going to have
 9
      a report. But when will we have that?
               MR. STERN: Mr. Campbell, his office and I are going
10
11
      to submit a report to the Court by Wednesday.
12
               THE COURT: By Wednesday.
13
               MR. STERN:
                          Would you like that e-mailed to Mr.
14
      Stanton or do you want something filed?
15
               THE COURT: I think we can e-mail it to Mr. Stanton.
16
      I can figure out what you're saying and what we're going to
17
      do. But I'd like your proposal on Wednesday to be as concrete
18
      as possible about a solution.
19
               MR. STERN:
                          I think we discussed a stipulation.
20
               THE COURT:
                          Yes.
21
               MR. STERN: So once Mr. Campbell and I have something
22
      we've drafted it's likely we have to circulate it to the rest
23
      of the subpoena committee. So we'll do our best to get you a
```

stipulation from everybody.

24

25

THE COURT: Okay. Yeah. And for the others who are here, the issues are partly that we're trying to come up with a process that subjects entities to only one subpoena in this case and not multiple subpoenas from plaintiffs and defendants.

And the process in theory can work and it will work.

But it's -- there have been some short turnarounds and there have been some parties who want to have input on to the subpoena but not be a signatory to it. So we're just trying to resolve those issues. Okay.

The next issue is the plaintiffs' authorizations for medical records and mental health records, substance abuse records, HIV, and genetic testing. And I guess the first question I have on that is I assume that no one has briefed anything since the briefing. Okay. Never mind. All right.

So what I'd like to do is start out with the time limitation on medical records. And at the initial decision that I made on this issue, which I believe was over the telephone if I'm not mistaken, I had said that the medical records should go back ten years. And I think I was thinking about adults at that time.

But and the defendants have argued that that means only five years prior to the 2014 switch. And that five years of medical records according to I think specifically the VNA but LAN defendants is inadequate.

And I noted that there seems to be an agreement on

```
employment records and educational records going back to 2004.
 1
 2
      So I guess my question of either Mr. Stern -- who's going to
 3
     handle this.
 4
               MR. STERN: So I think these authorizations apply
 5
     right now to the class plaintiffs.
 6
               THE COURT: That's right.
 7
               MR. LEOPOLD: And Ms. Berezofsky's going to argue for
 8
     the class plaintiffs.
 9
               THE COURT: Okay. So Ms. Berezofsky, do the class
10
     plaintiffs agree that '04 should apply to the medical records
11
      as well as the educational and employment records?
12
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: Would you like me to approach?
13
               THE COURT: Yeah. I think it would be helpful if you
14
     were here.
15
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: Esther Berezofsky for the class
16
     plaintiffs. Plaintiffs believe that the ten-year limitation
17
      is sufficient and appropriately balances the defendants' right
18
      to discovery against the plaintiffs' right to privacy.
19
      the request for 20 years or lifetime of records is excessive.
20
               THE COURT: We have a request by I think for Mr.
     Washington for you to speak up. This courtroom doesn't have
21
22
      the sound system that the other one has. So everybody has to
23
      speak up.
24
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: Okay. Apologies.
25
               THE COURT: Okay. Well and let me ask you, do you
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```
agree that for minors that their medical records should be
 1
 2
      their entire life?
 3
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: Your Honor, we don't. I think that
 4
      there should be some showing if there is a request for a
 5
      lifetime of records. So we don't. A minor would be anybody
 6
      under 18. And conceivably that would be 18 years of records.
 7
      And we really think that that is excessive.
 8
               We have -- plaintiffs have produced 65 authorizations
 9
      for 11 plaintiffs. Many of them are medical record
      authorizations for a period of ten years. I think at the very
10
11
      least that's a sufficient and it is a -- it's an accepted
12
      period of time in the context of this type of litigation for
      the access to plaintiffs' records.
13
               To the extent that down the road there are -- and
14
15
      they're also not targeted. So to the extent that the
16
      defendants at some point determine that there is some
17
      additional targeted or are additional targeted records for
18
      specific conditions that they may want, that request can be
19
      made then.
20
               But this -- you know, so in response to your
21
      question, I think for children or minors it would still be
22
      excessive.
23
               THE COURT: Is Ms. Devine -- who's responding?
24
      Campbell.
```

MR. CAMPBELL: I'll respond, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CAMPBELL: Good afternoon again, Your Honor.

James Campbell. I represent the three VNA defendants. On the specific issue of the amount of time that is addressed by the medical disclosures, I think this is not like some other case unless it's a lead case. Because lead is stored in the body for a long time. And it's particularly an issue for young people.

And you're going to -- will hear that throughout the litigation. We'll hear from a young person, a child that was exposed or allegedly exposed in Flint, that that exposure would result in years, you know, a lifetime or through adulthood that that person might be having lead issues.

So if that's the case and we think about just two alternative sources of lead that might be out there, lead paint or lead in the soil. And if you look at that, we need to have access to those records that go back and capture that.

Just as an example, Your Honor, I believe there's one of the minor plaintiffs identified in the Carthan complaint is 3 K K, a minor child. And I think based upon the record in the complaint that that child is 14. So if we did the math, that would bring us back to when that person or now 14-year-old, we wouldn't get the records when that person was most vulnerable.

And the evidence I think, Your Honor -- I don't know

that anyone would disagree with this. But the amount of lead that was in Flint and in everywhere has substantially decreased over time. So that back at this time period that we're talking about, there was more lead sources in Flint than probably everywhere than there was in 2014. So at least we should have access to when these people were most vulnerable.

Alternative causes for adults would be the same. If you have someone that's now 20 or 30 years old, when the exposure of that person back when he or she was young, an infant or a child, that's when they're most vulnerable.

So that's why we need these records and that's why the 10-year lookback now five years post the start of the Flint water issues doesn't make sense in this case.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Well, I'm going to go through each of these. So I'll need Ms. Berezofsky back here in a minute. But with respect to the timeframe, Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure controls the scope of discovery and requires that parties obtain or permits parties to obtain discovery regarding any non privileged matter that's relevant to a party's claim or defense and relevant to what we're discussing proportional to the needs of the case.

And I'm convinced that for the minors a lifetime of medical records is proportional to the needs of the case in light of the allegation -- the serious allegations of damage to minor's brains in their capacity in the future. And so if

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there was lead exposure through paint or some other source, I think that would be very important.
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I'm not convinced that 20 years is needed for the adults. And so I'm going to continue with the 10 year limitation that's currently in place.

And the other thing about this is you can certainly request that these records -- once you're taking the deposition and you find out that somebody had the very condition that they're alleging was caused by lead had it before when you're in the deposition, you can by all means go and get additional documentation at that time.

MR. CAMPBELL: So just to be clear on that, Your Honor, you're suggesting that if as we work through these cases we discover something that in this particular instance based upon this developed evidence we can come back to Your Honor?

THE COURT: Absolutely, yes.

MR. CAMPBELL: And if I could just one more time on the adults. Are you saying that it's ten years from today?

And I just would reiterate, Your Honor, that that excludes the time period when there would have been most vulnerable to a lead issue, so.

THE COURT: The adults?

MR. CAMPBELL: Adults, correct. That's why a longer period of time is reasonable.

```
1
               THE COURT: But the adults -- what are the range of
 2
      claims that the adults are making?
 3
               MR. CAMPBELL: Well, I believe and I'd stand
 4
      corrected that they include lead exposure. But there's also
 5
     all manner of other types of injuries including skin lesions
 6
      and hair loss. And I can't reiterate them now. But there's
 7
     certainly --
 8
               THE COURT: But the skin lesions and hair loss was
 9
     due to the -- they're alleging is due to the Flint water
10
      source changing in April of 2014. So if they had earlier lead
11
      exposure in their early years as a child, it wouldn't lead to
12
      skin lesions in 2015.
13
               MR. CAMPBELL: But it would lead to issues regarding
14
      lead related issues, Your Honor. I agree with you on the
15
     other things I think.
16
               THE COURT: Okay.
17
               MR. CAMPBELL: I don't particularly understand some
18
     of the damage claims.
19
               THE COURT: Okay.
20
               MR. CAMPBELL: I can say the words but I'm not quite
21
     sure I fully understand them.
22
               THE COURT: Okay. Well, here's -- I'm confident that
23
      ten years for the adults is an appropriate balance in this
24
     case at this time. But as you look at those records, and if
25
      the records says patient reports past exposure to lead
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exacerbated by this exposure, then you'll certainly have a
 1
 2
      right to get information on the past exposure.
 3
               So this doesn't foreclose your ability to come back
 4
      either seeking relief from the Court or an agreement from
 5
      plaintiffs to expand the scope.
 6
               MR. CAMPBELL:
                             Understood, Your Honor.
 7
               THE COURT: In those instances.
 8
               MR. CAMPBELL: Should I stay or vacate?
 9
               THE COURT: Yeah. Why don't you stay. And Ms.
10
      Berezofsky, if you want to join us. On the mental health
11
      records, we have a difficult situation -- I quess I need Ms.
12
      Berezofsky here. Because you are alleging serious physical
13
      and emotional injury, extreme disruption, inconvenience,
14
      discomfort, and emotional distress.
15
               You're alleging a series of emotional injuries that
16
      appear to me to be more than what we've called garden -- what
17
      some courts call garden variety. And so but I'd also like to
18
      focus on the professional negligence count in particular for
19
      all plaintiffs alleges embarrassment, outrage, mental anguish,
20
      fear and mortification, denial of social pleasures, and stress
21
      related physical symptoms.
22
               So I think that the damages that you're alleging flow
23
      from the professional negligence for all of your clients seems
24
      to take you out of the garden variety mental health damages.
25
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: Judge, I would submit to you that
```

there is a clear -- we have provided medical authorization for mental health, authorizations for mental health records for some of the class plaintiffs --

THE COURT: Right.

MS. BEREZOFSKY: -- who have alleged specific types of psychiatric or psychological conditions and ones which do fall within the parameters that for which the records would be appropriately disclosed.

The garden variety ones, you know, contrary to defendants' assertion that there is no -- that they have not been defined, there is a 5 factor test.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BEREZOFSKY: And to the extent that there are no expert reports being submitted for certain types of claims or that there is not a claim for negligent or emotional intentional infliction of emotional distress or a specific psychiatric condition alleged. The emotional distress damages that for which we're imposing a disclosure of records for are ones that one would expect for people who have gone five years without clean drinking water or water that they can use for bathing, cooking, and other things.

The kinds of emotional distress that flow from those kinds of damages or injuries or claims. And those are garden variety as opposed to ones where there's a specific condition for which expert testimony is being proffered.

THE COURT: So do you consider this outrage, mental anguish, fear and mortification, and stress related physical symptoms to be garden variety? You're not going to present an expert on that? You're not presenting any mental health records to prove that there's been stress related physical symptoms?

How are you going to show that if not through -- I wonder if we could use the other door instead of the squeaky door for everybody who's in here at least.

MS. BEREZOFSKY: Through the testimony of the

MS. BEREZOFSKY: Through the testimony of the plaintiffs, that's how we would. And so to the extent that we may need to tweak the language and amend the language to more accurately or carefully reflect what is garden variety, plaintiffs are prepared to do that.

THE COURT: I think when you say stress related physical symptoms, there's going to have to be some medical testimony for that in which case I think Mr. Campbell gets those records. And that's alleged as to all plaintiffs for the professional negligence.

MS. BEREZOFSKY: And for that reason I would submit that we would want to perhaps amend the language to reflect the distinction between what are garden variety emotional distress damages versus ones where there's a specific condition being alleged.

THE COURT: Okay.

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1
               MS. BEREZOFSKY:
                               With specific [Inaudible].
 2
               THE COURT: Mr. Campbell.
 3
               MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, the first thing that comes
 4
      to mind is if the cases were tried, the one thing/phrase that
 5
      we're not going to hear from any of the fine lawyers
 6
      representing the plaintiffs is that the emotional distress
 7
      claims that are going to be tried are garden variety. That's
 8
      not going to happen.
 9
               What's going to be presented is an immense -- you
      know, a profound effect on any given plaintiff in any given
10
11
      situation. And those words that are in the complaint, those
12
      give us I would submit to you, Your Honor, the right to
13
      discover this information, which is all subject to
      confidentiality orders. They're not going to be disclosed
14
15
      beyond the people that knew it that need to see it.
16
               And beyond that, Your Honor, this is a test of --
17
      we're entitled to test the plaintiffs' damages. If someone
18
      comes in and -- if someone comes in --
19
               THE COURT: I'm with you.
20
               MR. CAMPBELL: -- into the door and it squeaks -- I
21
      lost my train of thought.
22
               THE COURT: Well, you're saying that the plaintiffs
23
      are going to come in here and have extreme emotional distress
24
      and you expect to hear that in opening statements.
25
               MR. CAMPBELL: What I was going to say, Your Honor --
```

excuse me. That the defendants are entitled to test that as to alternative causes.

If someone has substantial other mental health issues or other issues that go to -- that would cause emotional distress or would cause the things that are alleged in the complaint that Your Honor has read, we're entitled to test the alternatives to that. What's going on in an individual's life that may be a different cause and may not be the cause regarding Flint water issues.

MS. BEREZOFSKY: If I can address that? The case law is clear. There is a distinction and there is something in the law, in the case law, that talks about garden variety. You're right, we may not be talking about that in front of a jury.

But what that means is the emotional reaction, the distress that's felt by people in a situation where the circumstances are what causes the response. And that is amenable to plaintiffs' testimony absent expert testimony.

And that is subject to the weight of the evidence to be heard.

THE COURT: Here's the situation though. You are now telling me the jury -- what I'm going to instruct the jury on is I'm not going to be using words like extreme serious physical and emotional injury including neurological disorders, exhaustion, memory loss, psychologic.

I mean, these are things you've already agreed to

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earlier would warrant a mental health release.
 1
 2
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: And to the extent that they cover
 3
     everyone, what I'm suggesting is that we separate out.
     Because we have produced medical authorizations --
 4
 5
               THE COURT: Right.
 6
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: -- for people who have those types
 7
      of injuries. And it's -- there are other people, many people
 8
     who fall into the other category. And they should not be
 9
      subject to that kind of privacy invasion or disclosure.
               THE COURT: Okay. Here's what I think is appropriate
10
11
             I think the Sixth Circuit has instructed me in the
12
     Maday v Public Libraries case that if plaintiff were not
13
      seeking emotional distress damages, then her conversations
     with the social worker about how she was feeling would likely
14
15
     be privileged. But when she does put her emotional state at
16
      issue, she waives that privilege. And the records can come in
17
      subject to any reasonable balancing by the district judge.
18
               So the balancing -- then I think the five factor test
19
     helps balance -- helps me make that determination of where the
20
     equities lie here. And in the situations that plaintiffs'
21
      class counsel has already more or less agreed such as with Ms.
22
     Carthan that those are more than garden variety damages with
23
     Rhonda Kelso and Tiantha Williams and her minor child.
24
               That -- I mean, you're alleging here psychological
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disorders including posttraumatic stress, difficulty coping

with normal stress, that those are things that do -- defendants have to be able to test those allegations.

MS. BEREZOFSKY: They do. But there is a balancing that this Court has to do.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BEREZOFSKY: And to the extent that the mental condition of the plaintiff is not at issue and that is one of the five factors where it is a response to a stressful situation, to a traumatic situation, to a difficult situation such as here -- five years not having clean drinking water -- and that is different. And that is what many of these people, what their claims encompass.

And those when you balance that against the invasion of their privacy to, you know, for disclosure of any mental health records from the past, I think unbalance that they should not be -- they should not have to disclose them.

If down the road in the course of discovery there is something that, you know, arises where there is a legitimate basis for further inquiry for those plaintiffs, you know, then we would likely agree that that disclosure should be made. But there are an awful lot of people who do fall into that category.

And to your point about the language that's currently in the complaint, we would amend that. We would propose to amend that.

MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor? 1 2 THE COURT: Yeah. Yes. 3 MR. CAMPBELL: We've been through this with multiple 4 hearings. And it's just some of the plaintiffs that you 5 identified, Barbara and Darrell Davis allege "profound 6 emotional distress". 7 To the extent that it is as Ms. Berezofsky just said 8 that it's a response to the drinking water, that's what the 9 plaintiff claims. And we shouldn't be in a position -- no 10 defendant should be in a position of just having to accept 11 that. 12 We should be entitled and I believe the case law 13 supports it that these issues are an issue and we're entitled 14 to discover them. And if what is out there is either nothing 15 or something that doesn't give rise to an alternative cause, 16 then that's fine. 17 But unless we're entitled to inquire, we have to 18 accept what the plaintiffs who are suing us, what they say 19 about it. Oh, you know, it's only a response to the water. 20 It's not -- it's fundamentally not fair. And I think the 21 Sixth Circuit case you identified supports that. 22 THE COURT: Here's what I think we have to do, which 23 is it's not going to be easy. But when I look at the five 24 factor test, which is what plaintiffs are arguing I should 25 apply, factor one, intentional or negligent infliction, we

don't have those causes of action. Those were alleged.

They're not surviving.

MS. BEREZOFSKY: Right.

THE COURT: Two, an allegation of a specific mental or psychiatric injury or disorder. When you say posttraumatic stress disorder, that is a specific psychiatric disorder. And I think Mr. Campbell is right. He has to have the opportunity to find out if there was another traumatic event around the same time that would have caused this.

A claim -- the third factor is a claim of unusually severe emotional distress. And to the extent plaintiff -- several of the named plaintiffs are making those allegations, I think they will have to sign a release.

For instance Darrell and Barbara Davis where it says pain, suffering, and profound emotional distress and inconvenience, I think that is exactly what you're talking about, Ms. Berezofsky, of this is a response to their allegations of what happened with their water source.

But when we get to the other ones that we've been discussing, PTSD, sleeping disorder, psychological disorder such as depression and chronic anxiety. If the person had chronic anxiety before this happened, we just need to know what can be attributed to your allegations in the complaint.

MS. BEREZOFSKY: So Your Honor, I know you're loathed to have us amend or, excuse me, refine the language in the

complaint. But I think given the fact these are class representatives -- excuse me -- and we are talking about potentially a large number of people, I think it's worth and important to do because there is a distinction between a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress and emotional distress that is responsive to a stressful situation.

And so I would ask that the Court grant the opportunity to refine that language so that everyone who makes any claim for emotional distress is not then subject to invasion of privacy that the defendant is arguing for.

THE COURT: Well, what makes -- so the problem is we want to come to a close with amending the complaint as soon as possible. So all of these interrogatories and things that are being propounded right now are worthwhile.

On the other hand I understand what you're saying, this is very sensitive material. And before people subject themselves to that, it better be worth it. I mean, it needs to be a valuable endeavor.

One question from what you're saying is that if you don't sign these releases then of course you can't rely on any of these providers to testify about damages. Or any other provider to testify about damages.

MS. BEREZOFSKY: Psychiatric or psychological damages, correct.

THE COURT: Right. Okay. So the only testimony

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you're suggesting you're going to bring in is testimony from
 2
      your clients' personal testimony?
 3
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: To the extent that they are limiting
      their claims to that kind of emotional distress, for lack of a
 4
 5
      better term, garden variety, yes.
 6
               THE COURT: But that's what I was saying earlier and
 7
      you were saying that's not workable. What I was saying
 8
      earlier is if you have clients who are not going to bring in
 9
      any expert testimony, any treating psychiatrist, social
      worker, or mental health provider testimony and are only --
10
11
      are limiting themselves to pain, suffering, and emotional
12
      distress generally deriving from the water situation, then I
13
      don't think you have to -- I would not order that these
14
      releases be signed.
15
               But to the extent you are seeking anything more than
16
      that, memory loss, psychological disorders, chronic anxiety,
17
      PTSD, I think you have to sign the release.
18
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: I don't disagree with that.
                                                              I think
19
      the issue is whether or not the plaintiffs can talk about
20
      their emotional distress.
21
               THE COURT: Oh.
22
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: That's really what we're talking.
23
      Can they testify about that in a deposition, in a trial, if it
24
      is the emotional distress responsive to a bad situation.
               THE COURT: Well, if it's the emotional stress
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responsive to the bad situation and limited to -- well, garden
variety doesn't tell us anything. But limited to saying this
stressed the heck out of me. I felt horrible. You know, I
felt bad about it. I was upset. I cried. Things like that.
         But if they're going to say I have PTSD.
                                                   I can't
concentrate at work. I can't -- I have denial of all social
            I have stress related physical symptoms.
think we have to find -- I think Mr. Campbell's entitled to
test the source of that.
         And the other thing is if he's only allowed, as
you've been explaining, to test the source of it, if it comes
out in the deposition, I mean then your client is limited to
what they can present to the jury and what you can say in
opening statements about the kinds of -- the ways your clients
suffered, so.
         MR. LEOPOLD: Your Honor, can I just say -- because
we were talking.
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THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. LEOPOLD: Ted Leopold for the class. While Ms. Berezofsky was here addressing this issue, I was thinking and speaking with a few of the class counsel on perhaps the way to try to address this as opposed to amending anything.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LEOPOLD: Because I think that is a certain certainly for the Court and is a concern for us.

1 THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. LEOPOLD: And I'm not sure why we cannot for each of our class representatives and potential class people down the road just stipulate at the time now for our class representatives, for example, that these are the specific -- I don't want to use -- I don't like the term garden variety claims. But these are the normal types of emotional issues that one is dealing with as a result of the occurrence that occurred from the bad water in Flint.

THE COURT: So you would --

MR. LEOPOLD: And affirmatively stipulating, we are not for this particular person not seeking posttraumatic stress disorder, all the more specific where one could perhaps argue that expert testimony may be needed or some foundation.

I think the normal emotional issues that are addressed from the bad water situation is one of credibility and the weight of the evidence that the jury will have to ascertain through the testimony of the client. And we would be able to have supporting testimony from family members or whatever it may be. And counsel for the defendants can take appropriate depositions and cross-examination at that time.

But I think by a stipulation to each of those individuals, that alleviates the amending issue. Just like any trial, you conform to the evidence as you move forward.

THE COURT: But that stipulation would have to be

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1
      made early on. Because the authorizations need to take place
 2
      presumably before the deposition takes place presumably way
 3
      before the trial.
 4
               MR. LEOPOLD: We certainly can do that for the class
 5
                        The people that are seeking authorizations
      representatives.
 6
      for.
 7
               THE COURT:
                          Right.
 8
               MR. LEOPOLD: We need to continue to interview them
 9
      and drill down on all these issues. And there are additional
10
      people other than those that we've already given
11
      authorizations for. Because of the more intense type of
12
      emotional injuries, we can do that.
13
               We can also get a stipulation that for these ABC and
14
      D class representatives, we are not seeking those types of
15
      emotional distress injuries.
16
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: And I agree completely and maybe
      amending language was too far afield.
17
18
               THE COURT:
                           Okay.
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: But I think the issue was that --
19
20
      what defendant's position has been that if we don't -- if
21
      these records are not produced or authorizations are not
22
      produced, that these plaintiffs who have the emotional
23
      distress response to an occurrence would not be able to talk
24
      about any kind of emotional distress. That's been the
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position. And that's really the objection.

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1
               THE COURT: Okay.
 2
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: So to the extent that we can
 3
      identify who of the 11 class representatives, who falls into
 4
     what category, I think that would be a solution.
 5
               THE COURT: Mr. Campbell.
 6
               MR. CAMPBELL: So this all -- we're still on the same
 7
      spot, Your Honor, where it's the plaintiffs that are bringing
 8
      the lawsuit, making the claims. And now they're going to
 9
      define what the defenses are by somehow saying that this
10
      emotional distress is separate from some other that they may
11
     have had.
12
               Now we don't know these people obviously. The only
13
     way we can inquire about that and to develop appropriate proof
      and to understand and to -- there might be a plaintiff that,
14
15
     you know, will testify that, yeah, I came home and the water
16
     made me upset and sad and I cried. But that there was -- that
     was going on for years and years beforehand. And it's
17
18
                   I mean, this is standard kind of discovery.
     documented.
19
               THE COURT: But let me compare it to this case for
20
     myself. I felt some stress before I got this case. But then
21
      I got this case. And my stress is way higher than it was.
22
     And so I don't think --
23
               MR. CAMPBELL:
                              But I believe you, Judge.
24
               THE COURT: We just know intuitively that people have
      stress in their lives. And they cry. I cry often. And but I
25
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cry more now than I ever have. So we know -- I mean, some things just don't take an expert and we just know that you either -- a jury's either going to believe somebody or not that they were stressed about this situation.

But when they're saying that it then led to a diagnosable mental health condition, then you get -- I think you get these records. So but the problem is sort of anxiety I mean, yeah, we're all anxious. I'm anxious right now. But I don't think no one's going to diagnose me with that because I'm sitting here.

So I think what we need is what -- Ms. Berezofsky and Mr. Leopold, what I'd like to do is see a submission from you about what you think goes in the bucket of this is sort of intuitively something that someone can testify to water changes, this whole -- you know what we know to be these cases takes place.

But I will tell you if it's borderline, I'll order the records to be released. Because I do think that if somebody says I then started drinking more and I started taking cocaine at night and stuff. Then you get to find out more about this, whether that was something they were doing beforehand also.

So what I would do is give the plaintiffs two weeks to submit to the court in a filing what you believe -- we'll just use the word garden variety -- constitutes the usual sort

of pain and suffering, what we just call pain and suffering,

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and what goes beyond that.
 3
               But be aware you're going to be limiting yourself in
 4
      what you can say in opening statements on these cases, which I
 5
      know you're aware of. And then you'll have an opportunity to
 6
      respond.
 7
               MR. CAMPBELL: Thank you, Judge.
               THE COURT: And I'll just figure that all out in the
 8
 9
      order.
10
               MR. ERICKSON: Your Honor could I be heard very
11
      briefly on this?
12
               THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Erickson.
               MR. ERICKSON: Can I do it from here?
13
14
               THE COURT: Yeah.
                                  Just speak up.
15
                              Philip Erickson on behalf of the LAN
               MR. ERICKSON:
16
      defendants. I just want to, you know, thinking out loud want
17
      to help everybody think through what this means when we're
18
      talking about class representatives.
19
               So if a stipulation is offered by the plaintiffs that
20
      these plaintiffs are only going to be asking for garden
21
      variety emotional distress damages, does that mean that nobody
22
      in the putative class is going to be seeking more serious
23
      damages?
24
               THE COURT: No. Because I think what's going to
      happen is some of the individuals are -- they're alleging PTSD
25
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1
      and they have to sign the release and they already have.
 2
      anyone in the putative class who's going to say PTSD,
 3
      alcoholism, other mental health medical conditions flowing
      from this --
 4
 5
               MR. ERICKSON:
                              That leads to my point though.
 6
               THE COURT: Okay.
 7
               MR. ERICKSON: If you allow the plaintiffs to say
 8
      because they want to stipulate and they don't want a
 9
      particular plaintiff to be subject to this discovery, then
10
      you're allowing the plaintiffs to put forth only their
11
      strongest cases --
12
               THE COURT: No, they're going to put forth --
13
               MR. ERICKSON: -- and not allowing us to discover the
14
      weaker cases.
15
               THE COURT: But they're going to decide if somebody
16
      is a weaker case in the sense of your terminology. They're
17
      going to say Judy Levy's just garden variety. She's just
18
      basic stressed out. She's not exceptionally.
19
               MR. ERICKSON: But Judy Levy, to use your example --
20
      in fact, I'm not comfortable using that example.
21
               THE COURT: Okay. We don't want the record to
22
      reflect all of my mental health conditions.
23
               MR. ERICKSON:
                              Why don't we just use Ms. Smith.
24
               THE COURT: Okay.
25
               MR. ERICKSON: Ms. Smith may really have more serious
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emotional distress.
 1
 2
               THE COURT: I see.
 3
               MR. ERICKSON: But there are difficulties with her
 4
     mental health background and they don't want that to be
 5
     discovered. So they enter into a stipulation as to Ms. Smith.
 6
     And defendants never get to discover information --
 7
               THE COURT: But it won't help --
 8
               MR. ERICKSON: -- that would be relevant and
 9
     significant.
               THE COURT: It won't help defendants because Ms.
10
11
      Smith can't collect exceptional damages for exceptional
12
     problems. She's just saying I have a medium small problem
13
     emotionally as a result of this.
14
               MR. ERICKSON: Right. But then she's not acting as a
15
      true representative.
16
               THE COURT: She's only acting as a representative of
      the people with small problems. Then we're going to have --
17
18
               MR. ERICKSON: But she's not a person with small
19
     problems. She is a person with, in my hypothetical, that in
20
      fact has more significant problems.
21
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: But she's not alleging them. And so
22
      she --
23
               MR. ERICKSON: She has alleged it already but now
24
     there's going to be a stipulation pulling back from that
25
                   That's fundamentally unfair to the defendants.
      allegation.
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1
               THE COURT: But you're not defending -- you're not at
 2
             You're not exposed to her extraordinary damages anymore
      risk.
 3
      because she --
 4
               MR. ERICKSON: And I understand that. There's a bit
 5
      of a double edge sword here.
 6
               THE COURT: Yeah.
 7
               MR. ERICKSON: But shouldn't the defendants be
 8
      entitled to discover as to all plaintiffs who have made that
 9
      allegation and not allow plaintiffs to go forward and
10
      selectively decide who they want to be discovered?
11
      point.
12
               THE COURT: I think I understand --
13
               MR. ERICKSON: Especially when we're talking about
14
      class representatives.
15
               THE COURT: But for instance, Snyder, this is Michael
16
      Snyder personal representative of John Snyder's estate.
      already know that he's saying pain, suffering, loss of society
17
18
      and companionship. And to me that is just your basic you
19
      don't have to go to a therapist to determine that.
20
               And even if he was -- even if he's schizophrenic and
21
      you would just determine this man is a paranoid schizophrenic,
22
      he's eggshell everywhere. He still is going to have some
23
      basic suffering from the loss of John Snyder. And so I don't
2.4
      think --
25
               MR. ERICKSON: I don't have a difficulty with living
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with the pleadings as they are and classifying plaintiffs
 1
 2
      according to the pleadings. I do have a difficulty with
 3
     allowing the plaintiffs now to go forward and say, guess what,
 4
     we don't want discovery as to these three.
 5
               THE COURT: I see.
 6
               MR. ERICKSON: So we're going to stipulate.
 7
               THE COURT: I see. Okay. And I get your point
 8
      there. And so I think what we have to do is go through the
 9
     plaintiffs who you have, which we've sort of already done.
10
     But in your submission, it will be clear that, for example,
11
     Marilyn Bryson, B-R-Y-S-O-N, says serious physical and
12
     emotional injury, what is --
13
               Ms. Berezofsky, are you suggesting that that is
     garden variety? The physical I'm not worried about. You're
14
15
     going to get the ten years of medical records.
16
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: Excuse me.
17
               THE COURT: And emotional injury. Is that serious
18
     emotional injury or is it just and emotional injury.
19
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: I would say emotional injury. But I
20
     will look at that again more carefully. And to the extent
21
      it's more than that, then you know what Your Honor's
22
      suggesting we do, we do. But to the extent that it is
23
     emotional injury in response to the occurrence, then those
24
     would be her claims.
25
                          Okay.
               THE COURT:
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Your Honor, may I be briefly heard?
 1
               MR. KLEIN:
 2
               THE COURT:
                          Yes.
 3
               MR. KLEIN: And I'll note the city did join in this
      motion.
 4
 5
               THE COURT:
                          Yes.
                                 Thank you.
 6
               MR. KLEIN: I really only have one point, which is
 7
             If we think through what the trial of this case is
      this.
 8
      going to be like and we've bucketed people into small problems
 9
      and big problems. And it's time to instruct the jury.
10
      you instruct them that plaintiff X has small problems and
11
      plaintiff Y has big problems and therefore -- I'm at a loss as
12
      to what the therefore.
13
               THE COURT: No. What we're going to instruct them.
      We're going to say serious -- we're going to say -- we're
14
15
      going to have a jury instruction on what they must find for
16
      extreme emotional distress.
17
               We're going to say for extreme emotional distress,
18
      you must find by a preponderance of the evidence that so and
19
      so had these conditions and that mental health professional
20
      verified that. Or whatever the instruction is going to say.
21
               And then we're going to say for plaintiff so and so
22
      who has pain and suffering and loss of companionship, you can
23
      determine that based on his testimony. If you believe him,
24
      and this is how we'll know if you believe him, then you may
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find in plaintiffs' favor or something like that or you may

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find in defendant's favor that he did not prove it if you do
 1
 2
     not believe him. Whatever.
 3
              MR. KLEIN: And God forbid the jury should find
 4
      liability, the question becomes what dollars you write in the
 5
     blank and what difference does it make that you've bucketed --
 6
      I mean, the bottom line I think is that the Court is -- and
 7
      I'm not going to reargue the brief. But I actually don't
 8
     think that this garden variety and forget the label. I don't
 9
      think it exists in law. I'm not going to reargue it. It was
10
     briefed as well as we were capable. But I think the fact that
11
12
               THE COURT: Well, it exists. We know all these cases
13
     have referred to it. I mean, it exists. People -- case --
14
     other judges have used that terminology.
15
               MR. KLEIN: And other judges in this circuit,
16
     district judges in this circuit and I think Maday rejected
17
     distinction. The law is not a seamless web. I think
18
     preponderance favors us. But clear I absolutely don't agree
19
      that there is broad consensus in this circuit or elsewhere
20
      that this garden variety concept is, in fact, an element of
21
      the law.
22
                          Okay. I understand what you're saying.
               THE COURT:
                           Thank you, your Honor.
23
               MR. KLEIN:
24
               THE COURT:
                          Mr. Stern.
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MR. STERN: Your Honor, I think that it's important

whatever you decide and however you decide to do it to consider that it's very likely whatever you decide is going to apply to probably 23,000 potential claimants who are all part of the census.

And if the way this is resolved is just by, you know, for these five plaintiffs suggesting this is garden variety or this isn't, what's ultimately going to happen is you may have for 150 pools of bellwether cases arguments on every single individual about what they've pled, how they've pled it, and whether it constitutes the type of claim that allows for and requires mental health records or doesn't.

And so I think there needs to be to the extent it's possible some kind of bright line form pleading such that we don't go through this process on each and every individual who ends up being a part of a bucket for bellwether trials.

THE COURT: And to that concern, which I'm concerned about as well, the short form and the fact sheet doesn't set forth the type of emotional damages that are being sought.

So what is your proposed solution for that? Just to have a bright line rule that if it's sort of pain and suffering, then no release. If it's --

MR. STERN: I don't know if there needs to be a rule. First of all, for the first bucket of cases, we're talking about lead cases and it was very narrow and specific. So I'm not sure that the application of this is really pertinent for

the first bellwether round.

But to the extent that it is, when people are going to check a box on a short-form complaint about what their damages are, it would be better if they knew -- they know their clients. If I know that my client is more in the -- and I don't -- to the extent that somebody has a thousand adults who are making these claims, if they know that these 900 are the garden variety type that Mr. Leopold and Ms. Berezofsky just described, then they should be able to appropriately check the right box so that this issue doesn't continue to come up on a case by case basis.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.

MR. CAMPBELL: Just on that, the issue of how this affects the bellwethers and individual plaintiffs, honestly, Your Honor, I haven't thought it there and whether or not a checking of the box is going to be sufficient.

My sense tells me that I don't think we'll agree with that. But to the extent that this goes on to the individual cases, we would just ask for an opportunity to address that specifically and the like.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CAMPBELL: Because I agree with Mr. Stern that this will come up.

THE COURT: Yeah. I think it will, too.

MS. BEREZOFSKY: And Your Honor, excuse me, in the

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submission that you've requested, presumably that is to create
 1
 2
      some sort of a framework or description or definition --
 3
               THE COURT: Correct.
 4
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: -- of what we're talking.
 5
               THE COURT: Yeah. And for what it's worth, to
 6
      respond to Mr. Erickson and Mr. Klein as well, what I'm trying
 7
      to do is not tie your hands and make your defense more
 8
     difficult. I'm trying to undertake a balancing test where we
 9
      know that the plaintiffs have brought this case and to a
10
      certain extent they're putting their personal lives and mental
11
     health conditions at issue. And they will have to testify to
12
     what happens to them.
13
               But the question is just how invasive does the
     process have to be? And I think everybody here wants it to be
14
15
     as noninvasive as it can consistent with your duty to your
16
      clients. So that's the only thing that I'm trying to do is
     balance the interests of individuals in their own privacy with
17
18
     the capacity to defend the case.
19
               And so when the individuals are claiming
20
     extraordinary damages, serious -- well, serious may not be the
21
      right word. But extreme. Then they're putting their mental
22
     health at issue and they waive the privilege. And where they
23
      I think only say pain, suffering, loss of society -- well,
24
     pain and suffering, then I think that they aren't putting that
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at issue.

```
So that's what I would like your submission to
 1
 2
               And I agree with Mr. Erickson that I don't want an
      define.
 3
      amendment to what's here. I just want you to define where you
 4
      think your current plaintiffs fall and why.
 5
               MR. LEOPOLD: Your Honor, when would you like that
 6
      due from --
 7
               THE COURT: Two weeks from today.
 8
               MR. LEOPOLD:
                             Thank you.
 9
                             And Your Honor, just to follow on some
               MR. CAMPBELL:
10
      of our discussion from the timeframe on the adults, I would
11
      think clearly and obviously to the extent we take discovery
12
      and issues develop that make it clear at least to whoever's
13
      doing the discovery that additional releases or information
14
      that the plaintiff is not -- we believe the plaintiff is not
15
      properly characterized --
16
               THE COURT: Right.
17
               MR. CAMPBELL: -- and we're entitled to more, we can
18
               Thank you.
      request.
19
               THE COURT: On the HIV records, I'm not convinced
20
      that you get those records unless you have reason to believe
21
      the person has HIV or AIDS or their -- is life expectancy at
22
      issue in this case?
23
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: You know, it may be but it is not --
24
      it's so attenuated, the request for HIV records and impact on
25
      life expectancy is so attenuated, there's no basis for saying
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that there is necessarily [Inaudible] impact. And I think it
 1
 2
      is such highly protected sensitive information that I think at
 3
      the very least defendants would have to make a showing or a
 4
      proffer why they should be entitled to that information.
 5
               THE COURT: I think so, too. Also just factually,
 6
      .16 percent of the county's population is HIV positive.
 7
      the entire county. So we're talking about a very small number
 8
      of possible plaintiffs in this case on the one hand. But on
 9
      the other hand, this is extremely sensitive information.
10
               I know we have a protective order, but I would want
11
      to see a showing that the plaintiff is alleging their life
12
      expectancy is going to be shortened by the defendant's
13
      conduct. And that you have reason to think HIV may bring
      their life to a close before lead or legionella.
14
15
               MR. CAMPBELL: Understood, Judge. That's fair. And
16
      I was going to bring to your attention that there is a I would
17
      call it substantial literature out there that relates HIV and
18
      some of the allegations being made in a case.
                                                     Skin lesions,
19
      rashes.
               There's even an article --
20
               UNIDENTIFIED PERSON: Can't hear.
21
               THE COURT: He's saying that HIV might -- well, not
22
      HIV infection but AIDS --
23
               MR. CAMPBELL:
                            Agreed, yes.
24
               THE COURT: -- causes skin lesions. But those are
25
      Kaposi sarcoma.
                       Those are different lesions than the lesions
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1 in this case.
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MR. CAMPBELL: Your Honor, I understand your ruling.

And to the extent that we find the need to pursue it we can

bring it to your attention.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CAMPBELL: I just wanted to let Your Honor know that there's literature out there that supports.

THE COURT: Okay. And if you get to a particular deposition and the plaintiff says, you know, I now have AIDS and it's caused by the stress I underwent, well then you'll get more information on when they were diagnosed and have they had AIDS since before 2014, or did they only have HIV infection. Then you can go into it. But before then, I think it's -- they have not waived their right to privacy on that issue.

On the substance abuse records, I think we've got the same thing going on as we have with AIDS and HIV, which is that first of all if you get ten years of medical records, you're going to get -- I know every time I go to the doctor they ask me how many glasses of wine I drink a night. And I say are you talking about a Flint water day?

They ask you every time you go if you've taken some street drugs that week or only prescription and all of that. So you're going to get this.

MR. CAMPBELL: Understood, Your Honor. It's the same

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If we develop it, if it pertains and there's evidence
      issue.
 2
      that we see that we need to pursue, again we can bring it to
 3
      your attention. But I agree with you about where we might
 4
     discover.
 5
               THE COURT: Okay. So at this point I'm not going to
 6
     require that plaintiff -- I'm not going rule that they have
 7
     waived their right to confidentiality on this issue.
 8
     comes to your attention and you think it's relevant, then you
 9
     can seek a release at that point. And the same with genetic
10
      testing. I didn't see that thoroughly briefed.
11
               MR. CAMPBELL: I don't think it was in the brief,
12
      Judge.
13
               MS. BEREZOFSKY: We addressed it in the event that it
14
     be raised.
15
               THE COURT: Yeah. Okay. All right.
16
               MR. CAMPBELL:
                              Thank you, so much.
17
               MS. BEREZOFSKY:
                                Thank you.
18
               MR. ERICKSON: Your Honor?
19
               THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Erickson.
20
               MR. ERICKSON: I was unclear and maybe I didn't hear
21
      the court. When does the ten year period start for adult
22
     medical records?
23
               THE COURT: It starts when I last made -- when we had
24
     that telephone call a month ago.
```

MR. STAMATOPOULOS: It was February 28th, Your Honor.

```
1
               THE COURT: Thank you.
 2
                              Thank you.
               MR. ERICKSON:
 3
               THE COURT: February 28th. That was a long time ago.
 4
      Okay.
 5
               The next issue is coordination of cases involving the
 6
          Since our last time together, Judge Parker made a
 7
      decision in the Burgess case versus United States. And she
      denied the EPA's motion to dismiss.
 8
 9
               So at this point Judge Parker has extended the time
      for defendants to answer or file a motion for interlocutory
10
11
      appeal. So we'll see what happens with that by June 7th and
12
      then discuss further how to coordinate with those cases at
13
      that time or before if the cases develop such that we need to
14
      address it before.
15
               In terms of other coordination, I had invited Judge
      Yuille to join us today. He was unable at the last minute to
16
17
      make it here. So I just want to let you know I've been in
18
      touch. I've had some conversation with Judge Yuille. And I
      know that you all had a May 9th I think status conference with
19
20
      him.
21
               So is there anything that either class or individual
22
      counsel wants to report about coordination with the state
23
      cases at this time?
24
               MR. STERN: Your Honor, Corey Stern. We simply --
25
      Judge Yuille I think is aware of the case management order
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1
      that you entered.
 2
               THE COURT:
                          He is.
 3
               MR. STERN: And seems to be inclined to mirror your
 4
     case management order. But he hasn't signed anything.
 5
     Nothing's happened in state court for quite some time.
 6
               THE COURT:
                          Okay.
 7
               MR. STERN: So there is no -- everything's
 8
     coordinated because he entered an order, but there's nothing
 9
     happening presently with regard to discovery in state court
10
     until he enters an order. And when he does, I would expect it
11
      to mirror the order that you entered here.
12
               THE COURT:
                          Okay. Good.
13
              MR. STERN: Mr. McAlpine may have something to add.
              MR. MCALPINE: No. I think that's fine.
14
15
               THE COURT: Okay. Well, Ms. Greenspan. I would
16
      appreciate it if you could provide an update on your work.
17
               SPECIAL MASTER GREENSPAN: Thank you. This will be
18
             We've been here for a while.
     brief.
19
               THE COURT: No one can hear you.
20
               SPECIAL MASTER GREENSPAN: Oh. How do I make --
21
               THE COURT: The mic doesn't work. I mean, it feeds
22
      into a recorder but it doesn't work to amplify.
23
               SPECIAL MASTER GREENSPAN: That one doesn't work
24
     either?
25
               THE COURT: None of them work for amplification.
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1
               SPECIAL MASTER GREENSPAN: Okay. All right.
 2
      talk this -- if i can talk this direction?
 3
               THE COURT: Yes, please.
 4
               SPECIAL MASTER GREENSPAN: Okay. All right. Just a
 5
                   In accordance with the case management order,
     quick update.
 6
     yesterday was the date to provide to counsel the list of cases
 7
      from which there will be a selection of bellwether cases for
 8
      the initial bellwether process. So that was posted.
 9
               And I've notified counsel if there's anyone who needs
     to have access to that information, did not get notified, just
10
11
     please contact me. And I can provide the information about
12
     how you get access to that case list.
               Second in terms of the census information, we have
13
     been collecting updated information and more case information
14
15
     or claimant information since the first interim report was
16
      filed. And I am about very close to filing a second interim
17
      report that will have additional information, will include
18
     more claims, will have more specific information about the
19
      status of some of those claims.
20
               So there will be refinement in the data. And as I
      said a little bit more additional information. So that is
21
22
      forthcoming and hopefully will flesh out the information that
23
     people have so you can understand what it is exactly that has
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claimants have actually sought the assistance of counsel, how

been identified or what claimants have really -- how many

24

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1
      many have actually filed cases. This covers both state and
 2
      federal court.
 3
               So again, I hope it will be helpful to everybody and
      it should be out in the next couple of days. And that's my
 4
 5
      update.
 6
                          Good.
                                  Thank you, very much.
               THE COURT:
 7
      wanted to take an opportunity to thank Ms. Greenspan for her
      work. She has incredibly detailed work to be done on this
 8
 9
      case and I appreciate it a great deal. So thank you on behalf
10
      of everybody here.
11
               Let me go back to the discovery coordination.
12
      have a request I believe from class plaintiffs to update the
13
      Court on discussions with state defendants regarding
14
      production of materials identified in the ongoing criminal
15
      litigation.
16
               Mr. Leopold, why did I put that --
17
               MR. LEOPOLD: I'm not sure. I think Mr. Novak can
18
      bring us up to speed.
19
               THE COURT: Okay.
20
               MR. LEOPOLD: I know he's had conversations with
21
      Richard Kuhl and some others.
22
                          Okay.
                                  Thank you.
               THE COURT:
23
               MR. NOVAK:
                          Your Honor, Paul Novak on behalf of class
24
      plaintiffs. We've had some initial telephonic conferrals with
25
      Mr. Kuhl in the Attorney General's office with respect to
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documents that had been identified primarily by virtue of some 2 motion practice in some of the criminal proceedings in Genesee 3 County Circuit Court. I think at this point the production, if I understand 4 5 it correctly, is in the possession of the criminal 6 prosecutorial counsel. And consequently I don't know that 7 it's available. I think at some point we will work through 8 those issues. Also in the context of what is now a broader 9 process of until the state defendants are parties in our case, 10 or answering parties I should say, we'll work this through as 11 part of the broader process of seeking discovery in a third 12 party capacity. 13 THE COURT: Okay. So at this point there's nothing that can be done or ordered or it's in a wait and see? 14 15 MR. NOVAK: I think it would be premature to seek 16 some compelling order at this point. 17 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right. 18 Well then the next status conference is planned for 19 June 19th at 2:00 PM. And the rest is set forth in the 20 agenda. So thank you all very much and I will see you then. 21 (Proceedings Concluded) 22 23 24 25

| 1 | CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER5 |
|----|--|
| 2 | I, Jeseca C. Eddington, Federal Official Court |
| 3 | Reporter, do hereby certify the foregoing 75 pages are a true |
| 4 | and correct transcript of the above entitled proceedings. |
| 5 | /s/ JESECA C. EDDINGTON 6/13/2019 Jeseca C. Eddington, RDR, RMR, CRR, FCRR Date |
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